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One of the key obligations of states is to provide security to their citizens in the
form of protection against aggression or attack. When there is a war or when there
is a serious threat to the existence of the state, exceptional measures to restore
peace and order may be inevitable. According to Article 15 of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the
relevant case-law, a state of emergency can be justified only by an exceptional
situation of crisis which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to
the organised life of the community of which the state is composed. The threat
must be imminent; its effects must involve the whole nation; the continuance of
the organised life of the nation must be threatened; the crisis or danger must be
exceptional in the sense that the normal measures or restrictions permitted by the
Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly
inadequate. In a state of emergency measures can be taken that derogate from the
protection normally afforded by human rights. This is not new. Rights are not
absolute and may legitimately be limited by law. But a derogation must be pro-
portional to the emergency. People can only be detained without trial for the
specific purpose of restoring peace and order during an emergency. The govern-
ment will have to justify the continued detention of such people to a court, and
there are still certain rights that it is not permissible to derogate from.
What is the meaning of a state of emergency and the rule of law in the post
9/11 period? The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were de-
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scribed as acts of war, and the attacks on the United States of America clearly
intended to threaten the life of that nation. President George W. Bush declared a
‘War on Terrorism’, with the goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda ‘to
justice’ through economic sanctions and military actions against states, which has
been interpreted as legitimising an emergency situation. Because the war on ter-
rorism will not end until the terrorists have been defeated, according to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, the state of emergency now seems to be constant. It will take
some time to defeat terrorism. Even after the 2004 presidential elections, George
W. Bush continued a state of emergency, bringing more and more power to the
executive branch. The fact that the USA has not differentiated between the terror-
ists who carry out these acts and those who harbour them has huge consequences,
also for EU member states. Not only does the question arise of how well Western
democracies have defended the civil liberties during the war on terror, but also of
what role the respective state powers – government, parliament and the courts –
should play in balancing civil liberties and terrorist threats.
Protecting the life of the nation is one of the most important tasks of a govern-
ment. A state of emergency may only be declared when the life of the nation is
threatened. This will occur when, in the light of threats facing the nation, the
normal powers of the authorities have become inadequate to govern the country.
It would be surprising if courts were able to make better judgments than govern-
ments in this field. How does Europe deal with this tension between law and
exception when governments see an existing terrorist threat to their liberal de-
mocracy from persons suspected of involvement in international terrorism? What
if foreign nationals present in these democracies are suspected of being involved
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, or
of being members of organisations having links with terrorists? The 2001 order in
the UK, which declared that the events of 11 September were ‘threatening the life
of the nation’, allowed Britain to opt out of Article 5 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, which bans detention without trial. It paved the way for the
indefinite imprisonment of foreign nationals who the Government suspects of
being terrorists, and came less than 24 hours after warnings that Britain was a top
target for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist network.People objected to it,
but the British government was determined ‘to get the balance right’ between
human rights and society’s right to live free from terror. Downing Street believed
that the public would back the moves, which it said were necessary to maintain
national security. Over the last few years most governments have changed immi-
gration laws and banking laws. Everybody is aware of the fact that preventing
terrorists from boarding an aircraft has become a primary concern. The ‘War on
Terrorism’ seems to have the imminent dangers of bringing too much power to
the government and of reducing civil liberties. Therefore, sometimes the courts
will have to intervene.
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In Security and European Human Rights: protecting individual rights in times of
exception and military action Elspeth Guild shows how European courts have re-
sponded to the charge of exceeding the law in the name of collective security. She
analyses the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and the in-
terpretations of the European Court of Human Rights. During the derogation of
Northern Ireland (1988-2001), in respect of Article 5 (right to liberty and secu-
rity), the European Court on Human Rights accepted the arguments of UK au-
thorities and confirmed that a wide margin of appreciation should be left to member
states as regards the assessment of an emergency threatening the life of the nation.
The Court even went so far as to accept the idea that there was a ‘quasi-permanent
nature’ to the emergency in Northern Ireland. But on 18 December 2001, again
in respect of Article 5, the United Kingdom introduced a new derogation under
Article 15, enabling the United Kingdom to pass legislation providing for the
indefinite detention of foreigners after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United
States (64). Although the House of Lords accepted the government’s argument
that there was a state of exception sufficient to justify the use of Article 15, Lord
Bingham did not accept that the indefinite detention of foreigners was propor-
tionate to the threat necessary to justify the use of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
In her accessible monograph, Elspeth Guild stresses how the supranational
human rights system is deployed by courts at the national level in ways which
impede claims made by state authorities to the legitimacy of their declarations of
exception. ‘In reaching to a source of law beyond the state but binding the state,
the national judge exercises his or her authority to adjudicate on the proportion-
ality of the state authorities’ efforts to escape some of their supra-national human
rights obligations’ (29). When the UK Attorney General attacked the wide juris-
diction of the House of Lords in the matter of interpretation of the derogation, he
argued that the courts should not interfere with the Government’s assessment of
the requirements of the exceptional times as this would be contrary to the prin-
ciples of parliamentary democracy. But Lord Bingham answered that the respon-
sibility of independent courts to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised
as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of
law itself. And courts are required to take account of relevant Strasbourg jurispru-
dence. As Guild points out clearly, the legality of a member state’s derogation to
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights is not a purely internal
decision for that state. If challenged by another state or an individual it is subject
to supranational scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights.
Guild writes that the issue of member state obedience to the judgments of the
European Court on Human Rights is beyond the scope of her book (31). But she
does illustrate that there is a reinforcement of supranational human rights in Eu-
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rope through the enforcement mechanisms of the European Union (Articles 6
and 7 EU). Although many lawyers will consider these EU mechanisms as too
weak, Guild defends that because of the ‘weaving together’ of the supranational
legal regimes which reinforce the disciplining of the disobedient state, the space
left for a state of exception is increasingly narrow. Guild states: ‘The rapid speed of
the rotation around the sun of the planet Mercury (i.e. the declaration of an
emergency by a state’s authorities) is moderated by the slow revolution of the
planet Saturn (the supranational court) … European state authorities are not ‘sov-
ereign’ in the act of exception’ (31).
That is an important difference with the USA where, with the help of the
media, the emergency situation became the basis for granting exceptional powers
to the executive branch. Guild writes that ‘the European Court on Human Rights
has shown no reluctance in defining torture, inhuman and degrading treatment
in such a way as to exclude some of the finer semantic arguments used by some
(current and former) officials within the US administration to justify what are
considered, in the European domain, dubious practices’(57).1  ‘They hate our
freedoms’, President George Bush said in a speech to the American Congress in
2001. But are these famous freedoms defended well enough? When new circum-
stances ask for a new balance between personal liberty and public safety, it can be
dangerous when emergency decrees lead to the fusion of legislative and executive
power. There is a growing tension between presidentialism and court-centred con-
stitutionalism. It is true, legal authority can undermine the state authorities’ claims
to legitimacy. But the question is whether courts, without seeing the ‘closed mate-
rial’ that governments possess, have enough information to decide whether some-
thing does or does not threaten the life of the nation. Of course, the courts do need
to review states of emergency, but it would also have been wise if Guild had un-
derlined the importance of parliamentary control over governments during states
of emergency.
This is the point of view taken by Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins in the
well-established sixth edition of British Government and the Constitution, an ideal
book for law students and also very attractive for students of politics and govern-
ment. The authors pay a great deal of attention to the question of whether or not
there was a particular threat to the United Kingdom in 2001. They conclude that
questions of whether there is an emergency and whether it threatens the life of the
nation are pre-eminently for the executive and the Parliament. But Turpin and
Tomkins also quote Lord Hoffmann in A. v. Secretary for the Home Department
[2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68, who came up with a different and very chal-
lenging opinion on this point (766):
1 In a footnote Guild mentions an article by John Yoo, ‘Courts at War’, 91 Cornell Law Re-
view 573 (2006). Yoo is an ardent promoter of executive rights in the war on terror.
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This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived physical
destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of fa-
natical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of
the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no
doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not said that what
happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, threatened the life of their nation.
Their legendary pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does
not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil commu-
nity… The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism
but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may
achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.
The American lawyers of the Department of Justice and the Pentagon said that
President George W. Bush had the power to override both domestic and interna-
tional law as a wartime Commander in Chief whose main duty was to protect the
American people. When the United States opened a new front in Afghanistan and
Iraq for the international fight against Al-Qaeda, they argued that Al-Qaeda and
its Taliban allies were not a state party to the Geneva Conventions. Do desperate
times really demand desperate remedies like arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention
without trial, suspension of habeas corpus, and even torture? The terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001 seem to be the beginning of a period of international state
emergency too, because the lines between internal and external security are much
more difficult to draw. This is a theme which is touched upon in a book about the
legal framework of peace missions, Ensuring and Enforcing Human Security. It is
written by Ulf Häussler and has a foreword by Elspeth Guild, the same foreword
she uses for own book.
Peace missions are policy tools whose purpose is to make a substantial contri-
bution to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In
launching them, the international community seeks to support stable constitu-
tional democracies based on respect for human rights and such good governance
as enables sustainable development. According to Ulf Häussler, aspects of institu-
tion-building, or even nation-building, are part of the respective fields of respon-
sibility of peacekeepers and peace-builders. Although not everybody will agree,
here it is possible to draw a link between the ambition of the governments of the
USA and the UK to reform political establishments in some countries and to
construct them into democratic constitutional states (Afghanistan, Iraq).
Häussler does mention the involvement of EU member states in interventions
authorised by the Security Council (Interfet in East Timor [1999], Opération Tur-
quoise launched by France in Western Rwanda [1994], and the EU mission Artemis
in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003]). In my view, the option of inter-
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vention deserves much more research – as a means to implement the responsibil-
ity to protect – in cases where the Security Council cannot reach an agreement on
the assessment of a humanitarian crisis situation and/or the response to it (NATO’s
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo [1999]). A very intriguing development is that
the African Union has acknowledged the need for future intervention in Article 4
of its Constituent Act:
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:
(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity; …
The author looks into the limits of authority as defined in principles and rules of
human rights and international humanitarian law. In peacekeeping, the agenda of
the military forces during deployment is very different from their domestic role in
a stable constitutional democracy. In the home country, the role is limited (to
external security), and internal security challenges are the domain of the police.
Häussler states:
Contemporary constitutional democracies only employ their troops domestically
in a state of emergency – and they are extremely reluctant to use this ultima ratio
of defending their sovereignty internally. Frequently entrenched in constitutional
law, the differentiation between internal and external security and the separation
of police tasks and military tasks accordingly, is an expression of the domestica-
tion of the Westphalian sovereign: any practice of law enforcement involving acts
of (civil) war inflicted by a government on its own nation is irreconcilable with
the notion of democracy.(10)
Because international humanitarian efforts and human rights law are reaching out
into each other’s respective domains, Ulf Häussler presents two relevant questions
concerning the applicability of international human rights instruments to peace
missions: 1) do human rights instruments apply during armed conflict and also
during peace missions?; 2) are human rights instruments extraterritorially appli-
cable? (68). Human rights instruments address the first question in their deroga-
tions clauses concerning cases of states of emergency. The Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966) could be regarded as ‘ambivalent’ in this respect: Article 4
of the Covenant refers to a ‘time of public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed’. Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (1950), however, speaks of ‘time of war
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ and Article 27 of the
American Convention on Human Rights (1969) deals with ‘time of war, public
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danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State
Party’. Concerning the second question: one may doubt whether the framers of
the human rights treaties had the classical differentiation between own and for-
eign nationals in mind when they devised these instruments and their derogations
clauses. Derogations clauses were adopted with a view to tackling nothing but the
domestic state of emergency, usually concomitant with armed conflict (70).
After systematic evaluations of relevant military operations and decision-mak-
ing processes, Häussler concludes that the legal framework of peace missions is
complex and that the limits of authority in peace missions are less than well-
defined. But it should be beyond doubt that from the perspective of those living
in a state receiving a peace mission, the notion of peace and security means that
their human rights are protected and ensured (168). Western democracies under
the rule of law always have to defend their precious freedoms, even outside their
state borders. Human rights are and will be their most important weapon in the
fight against tyranny and terror, at home and abroad.

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